Basil Mitchell
Michell states that Flew makes an error in his analysis of
the religious believer because the Christian attitude is not that of the
detached observer, but that of the believer.
Mitchell is different than Flew as he is saying essentially
that there is a bigger picture. Just because of one aspect of God may be put
into question such as ‘God is omnibenevolent ‘when there is the existence of
evil it doesn’t mean that all other statements about God are meaningless.
For example a stranger may see two friends fighting. To the
stranger it may appear that the two friends are in fact mortal enemies however
this is not the true. The stranger applying the falsification principle would
say that the friends are not open to being wrong and so that there statement ‘we
are friends’ is meaningless however this no correct. While the strangers
reasoning according to the principle is correct he is still in fact wrong due
to his inability to see the whole picture, it is not through any fault of his
own but rather just lack of experience.
Mitchell agrees with Flew in that religious language is an
assertion however unlike Flew, Mitchell sees these assertions as explanations
rather than pure assertions. Mitchell believes that these explanations when out
together give a picture of God they are parts of a picture that makes up God
rather than meaningless vague statements that a theist will fall back on when
trying to justify a position
‘God loves humanity’
is not conclusively falsifiable but it can be treated in one of the three following
ways.
11)
As provisional hypotheses to be discarded if the
experience goes against them.
22)
As significant articles of faith, something of
belief (but not of meaning?)
33)
As vacuous formulae (help what does that mean!?)
to which experience makes no difference and makes no difference in real life.
Mitchell Summary
Religious language makes truth claims about the world
Individual religious statements need to be put in the border
context of the whole belief system
Religious language is not open to falsification because it
is a matter of faith
Ed, this feels less confident than your previous post on Flew. 'Vacuous formulae' are statements that are incoherent or insane. In other words, Mitchell raises three options for 'God-talk':
ReplyDelete1. Religious language is open to falsifiability (it's not, so would be meaningless under Flew's categories)
2. Religious language is a statement of belief (and therefore has meaning to the believer)
3. Religious language is utterly incoherent (and therefore is meaningless)
In this sense, Mitchell is not unlike Hare and Wittgenstein, insofar as he finds a place for meaningful 'God-talk', but does so at the possible expense of limiting it to communication between religious people (or even to people functioning within the same religious language game/blik).
The stranger and friends example you use is not entirely clear: you needed to make the point that the statement the friends are making, that the stranger considers to be meaningless, is that they are, in fact, friends. It is this statement that they are not open to falsifying.